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Informativeness of the Expanded Audit Report: Evidence from China 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether the expanded audit report is informative to investors in the setting of 
an emerging economy. Using the recent staggered adoption of the expanded audit report for A+H 
and A share firms in China, we find robust evidence that abnormal trading volume and earnings 
response coefficients are higher, and stock price synchronicity are lower, in the post-adoption periods 
than in the pre-adoption periods. In additional tests, we find that the expanded audit report is more 
informative for non-State Owned Enterprises and for firms with higher information asymmetry. To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document systematic evidence that the expanded 
audit report is incrementally informative to investors in an emerging economy.  
 
Keywords: expanded audit report; information content; key audit matters 
JEL Classifications: M41, M42, M48 
Data Availability: data are available from the public sources cited in the text 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prompted by the global financial crisis, the investment community has been calling 
for greater transparency from auditors to give users of financial statements more insights 
into the audit process and the auditor’s roles. Standard setters internationally have 
responded by revamping the audit report to provide more than a pass/fail opinion. In 
2013, the auditors of UK listed companies were required for the first time to include a 
discussion of the key risks identified in the audit and how they are being addressed in the 
audit report. Other jurisdictions have followed the lead of UK in introducing greater 
disclosures in the audit process. For example, in January 2015, similar requirements were 
introduced in the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) with an effective date of 
financial years ending on or after 15 December 2016. In June 2017, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enacted a new auditor reporting standard that 
requires the auditor to include a discussion of critical audit matters and to provide audit-
specific information about particularly challenging, subjective, or complex aspects of the 
audit.1 
Whether the expanded audit report provides information useful to investors 
continues to be a debatable question. On the one hand, regulators hope that the expanded 
audit report requirements will make the audit more relevant and informative to financial 
statement users, thereby reducing information asymmetry about the company's financial 
reporting (e.g., FRC 2013; PCAOB 2017). Supporting this notion, experimental studies 
                                                             
1 Communication of critical audit matters for audits of large accelerated filers will be effective for fiscal years 
ending on or after June 30, 2019, and communication of critical audit matters for audits of all other 
companies will be effective for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2020. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432107
  4 / 64 
 
 
 
provide evidence that market participants find the risk disclosures in the expanded audit 
report useful for decision-making (e.g., Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014; Kachelmeier, 
Rimkus, Schmidt, and Valentine 2019; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016). On the other 
hand, empirical studies find little or no evidence to support the information content of the 
expanded audit report. Specifically, Gutierrez, Minutti-Meza, Tatum, and Vulcheva (2018) 
fail to find that the new U.K. auditor reporting or the variation in the expanded reports’ 
content significantly affect investors’ reaction to the release of auditors’ reports. Lennox, 
Schmidt, and Thompson (2018) do not find risk disclosures incrementally informative 
using short-window market reactions but find risk disclosures reliably capture the 
uncertainty in accounting measurements using long-window tests. Our study provides new 
insights on this debate by examining the informativeness of the expanded audit report in 
the setting of an emerging economy—China.  
On 23 Dec 2006, the Chinese Institute of Chartered Public Accountants (CICPA) 
issued No.1504 Auditing Standard that requires auditors to disclose key audit matters 
(KAM) in audit report.  China offers a unique setting to examine the informativeness of 
the expanded audit report for several reasons. First, A+H share firms, which are listed on 
both the stock exchanges in Mainland China and Hong Kong, are required to adopt the 
new audit reporting after January 1, 2017 and all other A share firms, which are listed only 
on the stock exchanges in Mainland China, are required to adopt it after January 1, 2018. 
This phased adoption affords a quasi-natural experimental research setting that allows us 
to compare changes in the treatment group with changes in the control group subsequent 
to the expanded audit report requirements. Second, concurrent studies focus on the new 
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audit reporting model in the U.K. which also require auditors to discuss in addition to the 
key audit matters, the applied materiality threshold and how it affects their audit scope. 
Because the disclosed materiality threshold could be informative of the firm’s financial 
reporting quality (Goh, Lee, Li, Li, and Wang 2019), this can potentially confound any 
analyses that are solely interested in examining how the market reacts to the new risk 
disclosures. On the other hand, the new China auditing reporting standard only requires 
auditors to disclose key audit matters, hence allowing us to better isolate the effects of any 
market reactions to the risk disclosures content of the expanded audit report. Third, China 
have a different information environment from the U.K. that allows us to provide evidence 
on the informativeness of the expanded audit report in a contrasting setting. Further, as 
the world’s largest emerging economy, China is economically significant and provides rich 
market depth for our empirical tests to explore cross-sectional variation in the effect of the 
expanded audit report. 
Whether investors would find the expanded audit report incrementally informative 
in the China setting is not immediately obvious. On the one hand, there is a low demand 
for high quality external reports and information for control purposes because many 
publicly listed companies are still state-controlled. State-controlled firms also have less 
incentive to disclose bad news in a timely manner (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Piotroski, 
Wong, and Zhang 2015). Given the limited firm-level reporting and lack of alternative 
sources of information for investors (e.g. dissemination of information by financial 
intermediaries and media are ineffective), investors are more likely to find the risk 
disclosures in the expanded audit report incrementally informative vis-à-vis investors in 
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more developed economies. Furthermore, the prevalence of earnings management in 
China suggests that investors are more vulnerable to management’s expropriation of firm 
resources and hence there would be a stronger demand for risk disclosures information in 
the audit report to better assess firms’ earnings quality. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that investors would not find the 
risk disclosure informative. First, prior research fails to find evidence that financial 
disclosure and mandatory reporting regulation are effective in an emerging economy. For 
example, He, Wong, and Young (2012) find that mandatory adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards does not increase earnings’ usefulness in China. Second, 
because auditor independence is relatively weaker in China compared to most developed 
economics, it is questionable whether investors would find the risk disclosures supplied by 
auditors credible enough for decision-making. 
We empirically examine the informativeness of the auditor risk disclosures using 
firms listed on the Mainland China stock exchanges. We exploit the staggered adoption of 
the expanded audit report by A+H and A share firms, and use both pre-post and 
difference-in-differences research designs for our analyses. Our main proxies for the 
informativeness of the expanded audit report are: (1) cumulative absolute abnormal returns 
and abnormal trading volume around the issuance of the annual report, which includes the 
auditor’s report, (2) earnings response coefficients, and (3) stock price synchronicity. Based 
on the sample period from fiscal years 2014 to 2018, we obtain the following results. 
First, we find little or no evidence that the three days abnormal returns surrounding 
the date of the issuance of the expanded audit report is significantly greater in the post-
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adoption period compared to the pre-adoption period. However, we find that abnormal 
trading volume significantly increases following the adoption of the expanded audit report. 
This result provides evidence that the expanded audit report provides new information to 
investors. Second, we find that the earnings response coefficient is significantly greater 
after the adoption of the expanded audit report. This finding is consistent with the notion 
that the expanded audit report enhances investor perceptions of the firm’s financial 
reporting quality. Finally, we find that stock price synchronicity significantly decreases 
following the adoption of the expanded audit report. This result suggests that the expanded 
audit report facilitates the flow of firm-level specific information to capital market, thus 
enabling investors to focus more on firm-level unique information for decision-making.  
We conduct several analyses to validate our inferences. For example, we re-
estimate our main tests using alternative measures for the informativeness of the expanded 
audit report and obtain similar results. Next, given that A+H share firms may have 
fundamentally different characteristics from the other A share firms, we test the robustness 
of our results using entropy balancing method and propensity score matched sample. We 
continue to find similar results. In addition, to dispel the notion that the market reaction 
that we documented are driven by a differential time trend for treatment and control firms, 
we test the parallel trend assumption and find supportive evidence.  
We also gain additional insights by conducting several cross-sectional tests and 
further analyses. First, we examine whether the expanded audit report is more informative 
in circumstances where there is a greater demand of information for decision-making. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that the increases in abnormal trading volume 
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and ERCs, and the decrease in price synchronicity in the post-adoption periods are more 
pronounced for non-State Owned Enterprises, smaller firms, and firms that have lower 
analyst following. Second, to afford stronger inference that the investors’ reaction that we 
documented earlier are more likely attributable to the expanded audit report rather than 
the annual report, we also examine the number of downloads of the audit report relative 
to the number of downloads of the annual report surrounding the adoption of the 
expanded audit report. Consistent with our expectations, we find that audit report 
downloads relative to annual report downloads is significantly greater in the post- than in 
the pre-periods. In addition, we find that the negative market reaction to modified audit 
opinions is more pronounced in the post-periods, indicating that the expanded audit report 
is also more informative in terms of understanding the implications of modified audit 
opinions. Finally, we examine whether the informativeness of the expanded audit report 
could be in part due to an increase in the quality of the auditor’s work. We find that for A 
share firms, discretionary accruals decrease and audit fees increase in the post-adoption 
periods, suggesting that auditors curb more discretionary accruals and exert more audit 
efforts in the post-adoption periods.  
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate over the usefulness of the auditor’s 
report reforms. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the 
informativeness of the auditor risk disclosures in an emerging economy. It extends and 
complements existing studies such as Gutierrez et al. (2018) and Lennox et al. (2018) who 
find that the expanded audit report is not incrementally informativeness in a large and 
developed economy such as the U.K. By exploiting the staggered adoption of the new 
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audit report requirements in China, we are able to afford stronger causal inference on the 
informativeness of auditor risk disclosures in the second largest economy in the world. 
Our findings suggest that the risk disclosures in the expanded audit report are 
incrementally informative to investors in a setting where this information is less likely to 
be available in alternative public sources and where demand for such information would 
presumably be high. This finding is in line with the view of regulators that “expanded 
auditor reporting may be relatively more informative for companies where alternative 
sources of information are less available” (PCAOB 2017). Our finding also supports Chen, 
Jiang and Zhang (2019) who show that audit quality disclosure increases auditors’ effort 
incentives, if and only if the underlying financial reporting quality is relatively weak. Given 
that less developed countries such as China have weaker financial reporting quality, our 
results suggest that additional risk disclosures (which is informative of audit quality) can 
induce greater audit effort and hence higher audit quality; this can enhance the decision-
usefulness of financial reports for the investor.  
A concurrent study by Liao, Minutti-Meza, Zhang, and Zou (2019) (hereafter 
“LMZZ”) examine the effect of KAMs for companies listed in Hong Kong and they do 
not find evidence that KAMs provide incremental information to investors or that the new 
rules affect audit fees or quality. There are major differences between our study and LMZZ. 
First, in our difference-in-differences research design, our treatment group comprises 
either A+H share firms (i.e., firms listed in both Mainland China and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges) that first adopt the expanded audit report after 1 Jan 2017, or the A share firms 
(i.e., firms listed only in mainland China stock exchanges) that first adopt the expanded 
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audit report after 1 Jan 2018. In the above design, the control group comprises the A and 
A+H share firms, respectively. On the other hand, in LMZZ, the treatment group 
comprises firms listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange that are subject to the new audit 
report requirements and the control group comprises firms listed in Mainland China stock 
exchanges. Second, our measures of informativeness of the expanded audit report are 
absolute abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, earnings response coefficients (ERC), 
and stock price synchronicity. On the other hand, LMZZ focuses on absolute abnormal 
returns, abnormal trading volume, and bid-ask spreads. Finally and more importantly, 
LMZZ fails to find any evidence that KAMs provided incremental information to 
investors in the Hong Kong setting. In strong contrast, we find robust and consistent 
evidence of the informativeness of the expanded audit report in the setting of China, an 
emerging market. Together, our study and concurrent studies can help inform standard-
setters and regulators around the world, especially those in developing economies, who 
would otherwise be skeptical about the usefulness of the risk disclosures in the expanded 
audit report. Our study further suggests that standard-setters and regulators should 
calibrate disclosures in the audit report to suit the unique institutional environment of each 
country. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the 
related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research 
methodology. Section 4 presents the primary analyses and Section 5 presents the additional 
analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
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II. BACKGROUND, RELATED LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Background and Related Literature 
Auditors play a critical role in the capital markets by monitoring management and 
protecting shareholders’ interests through an independent examination of the financial 
statements. However, the traditional audit report has been challenged by investors because 
it lacks firm-specific information to address the information asymmetry between investors 
and auditors (PCAOB 2017). In response to demand for a more informative auditor’s 
report, standard-setters, regulators, and auditors worldwide have taken steps to promote 
audit reporting reforms. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the U.K. took the lead 
by introducing new requirements for auditor’s reports on companies with effect for 
periods commencing on or after 1 October 2013. Specifically, ISA (UK and Ireland) 700 
(Revised) (“ISA 700”) requires auditors to include within their audit reports (a) a 
description of those assessed risks of material misstatement that were identified by the 
auditor and which had the greatest effect on the overall audit strategy; the allocation of 
resources in the audit; and directing the efforts of the engagement team; (b) an explanation 
of how the auditor applied the concept of materiality; and (c) a summary of the audit scope, 
including an explanation of how the scope was responsive to the assessed risks of material 
misstatement described in (a) and the applied  materiality as described in (b). Following 
Lennox et al. (2018) and for brevity, we refer to the disclosures in requirement (a) as 
“auditor risk disclosures” 
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Other regulators followed the lead of FRC in mandating more auditor risk 
disclosures. In January 2015, IAASB released the revised International Standards on 
Auditing Reporting Standards, Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements and 
Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor's Report. The most significant 
change is for the auditors to include Key Audit Matters (KAMs) in the auditor’s report 
(IAASB 2015) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2016. KAMs, which are 
selected from matters communicated with those charged with governance, are those 
matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, were of most significance in the audit 
of the financial statements of the current period. On Dec 28, 2016, the Chinese Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) followed the lead of IAASB and issued the 
Auditing Standard (No. 1504) "Communicating KAMs in the Independent Auditor's 
Report", which require auditors to address KAMs identified during the present audit 
engagement. More recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
finalized its reform on audit reporting in June 2017, mainly requiring the auditor to discuss 
critical audit matters (CAMs), auditor tenure, and audit firm independence in the audit 
report. CAMs are defined as issues communicated to the audit committee that relate to 
material financial statement accounts and that involve challenging, subjective, or complex 
auditor judgment (PCAOB 2017).2 Hence, both KAMs and CAMs are similar in spirit (in 
terms of intent and content) to the audit risk disclosures requirements by the FRC.  
                                                             
2 A CAM is defined as any matter arising from the audit of  the financial statements that was communicated or required 
to be communicated to the audit committee and that: (1) relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the 
financial 
statements, and (2) involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment. 
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Experimental studies find mixed results on how the expanded audit reporting 
affects investor decisions. For example, Christensen et al. (2014) find that experimental 
participants are more likely to change their investment decisions when a CAM is included 
in the audit report than when they are not. Similarly, Doxey (2015) find that a CAM causes 
experimental participants to perceive a lower risk of misstatement and thus increase their 
tendency to invest. Kachelmeier et al. (2019) find that their experimental participants have 
less confidence and perceive less auditor responsibility for a misstatement in a financial 
statement area disclosed in the auditor’s report as a CAM. However, Gimbar et al. (2016) 
found that both related and unrelated CAMs increase auditor liability, but to a lesser degree 
under imprecise standards. 
Empirical studies found little or no evidence that the expanded auditor’s report 
providing little incremental information to investors. Reid et al. (2019) find that the new 
auditor reporting regime in the U.K. is associated with an improvement in financial 
reporting quality as proxied by significant decreases in absolute abnormal accruals and the 
propensity to just meet or beat analyst forecasts, and a significant increase in earnings 
response coefficients. However, Gutierrez et al. (2018) fail to find any evidence that the 
regulatory change in the U.K. or the variation in the expanded reports’ content significantly 
affected investors’ reaction to the release of auditors’ reports. Using short-window market 
reactions tests, Lennox et al. (2018) find that the risk disclosures generally lack incremental 
information content. In additional analysis, they explore whether the risk disclosures lack 
incremental information content because investors already know about the risks from 
other sources, such as annual reports, conference calls, and earnings announcements. They 
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find that approximately 65 percent of the risks disclosed by auditors in the audit report 
had already been previously disclosed by management or the audit committee. 
The finding in Lennox et al. (2018) is consistent with the argument that risk 
disclosures may not be incremental informative in the U.K. setting because this 
information could already exist in public domain. It is also consistent with PCAOB’s (2017) 
view that “expanded auditor reporting may be relatively more informative for companies 
where alternative sources of information are less available”. Prior literature has shown that 
country’s institutional infrastructure could influence their financial reporting practices and 
disclosure decisions (e.g., e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Ball, Kothari, and Wu 2003; Leuz, Nanda, 
and Wysocki 2003; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2004). Because the U.K. is a developed 
market with strong investor rights and legal enforcement, risk disclosures information may 
be more easily obtainable from alternative public sources, thus rendering them less useful 
when disclosed in the audit report. For that reason, our study exploits the unique 
institutional features of China to investigate the informativeness of the expanded audit 
report in an emerging economy. 
Hypothesis Development 
We argue that there are at least two reasons why investors would find the risk 
disclosures information in the expanded audit report informative in China.   
First, although China have achieved significant economic growth since the 1980s, 
it still lacks the institutional arrangements that create incentives for high corporate 
transparency (Piotroski and Wong 2012). For example, although the government has 
corporatized its state enterprises by listing them on the stock exchanges, it still maintains 
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ownership control of these listed companies and retains the rights to appoint its CEO. As 
a result, stated-controlled firms still constitute a significant part of the stock exchanges. 
Because the government can use internal reporting mechanism and performance measures 
to monitor CEOs directly, this provides lower incentives for high quality external reports 
and information for control purposes. Furthermore, instead of wealth maximization, 
politically connected firms have incentives to suppress bad news in order to hide 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking activities, as well as to pursue political objectives (Piotroski, 
Wong, and Zhang 2015).  
Due to limited firm-level reporting and disclosure practices, investors would have 
to rely on alternative sources, such as financial intermediaries or media, for firm-specific 
information. However, the market for financial analysts is not well developed in China as 
Chinese analysts face limited information and incentives when making firm-level forecasts 
(Ang and Ma 1999; Chen, Ke, and Yang 2013). In addition, the vast majority of media 
outlets in China are controlled by the government, and hence firm-specific information 
disseminated by these media outlets tends to be biased and constrained (Piotroski and 
Wong 2012). Given the opaque information environment and lack of alternative sources 
of information, the auditor’s report issued in China, especially with the accompanying new 
audit risk disclosures, becomes a more formal and salient source of information, vis-à-vis 
similar reports issued in developed countries. Consistent with this notion, Chen, Su, and 
Zhao (2000) find that Chinese investors react significantly and negatively to modified audit 
opinions and argue that the lack of competing information sources in the Chinese market 
may explain why announcements of initial MAOs attract so much attention from investors. 
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Consequently, we expect investors in China to find the mandated risk disclosures 
information in the expanded audit report incrementally informative vis-à-vis those in more 
developed economies.    
Second, we expect the risk disclosures information to be incrementally informative 
in China because of the prevalence of earnings management. In general, earnings 
management tends to be a greater concern in countries with weak institutional framework 
and investor protection (Leuz et al. 2003). In the China context, earnings management is 
exacerbated by regulatory pressure and financial needs. For example, firms must make two 
consecutive years of profits before they can be listed on an exchange (Aharony, Lee, and 
Wong 2000). In addition, according to guidelines introduced by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1998, a listed firm will be designated a special treatment 
(ST) firm if it reports a net loss for two consecutive years. A ST firm’s semi-annual report 
must be audited. If it reports a net loss for three consecutive years, it will be suspended 
from normal trading. As a result, Chinese firms engage in both accruals-based earnings 
management and real transactions to achieve specific ROE targets and avoid losses 
(Piotroski and Wong 2012). Furthermore, the widespread use of related party transactions 
and group and pyramidal ownership structure afford more opportunities to manage 
earnings in China (Jian and Wong 2010; Piotroski et al. 2015). Given that outside investors 
in China are more vulnerable to management’s expropriation through earnings 
management, we hence expect investors to have a stronger demand for risk disclosures 
information in the audit report to enable them to better assess the firm’s earnings quality.3 
                                                             
3 A recent paper by Chen, Jiang and Zhang (2019) also supports our contention that investors would find the audit risk 
disclosures more informative in less developed countries that have weaker financial reporting quality. Specifically, the 
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Notwithstanding the above arguments, there are also reasons to believe that 
investors may not find the risk disclosures incrementally informative in the China setting. 
First, prior research finds that the economic effects of disclosure regulations tend to be 
limited in China. For example, Barber, De George, Lehavy and Trueman (2013) find that 
while earnings announcement premia generally exist across the globe, such a phenomenon 
is absent in China. In addition, He et al. (2012) suggest that in emerging markets such as 
China, the intended benefits of improved transparency through mandatory adoption of 
high quality accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), may fail to materialize. One possible reason is that IFRS, an accounting system 
oriented towards providing relevant information to investors, may not fit with 
environments in which accounting plays a less powerful contracting role.  
Second, auditor independence in China is weaker compared to most developed 
economics because audit firms and the Chinese accounting profession are not only 
regulated but also supervised by their local government (Chen, Su, and Zhao 2000; 
Piotroski and Wong 2012). This practice creates conflicts of interest between the managers 
who are politically connected and the auditors located in that same local region. Given the 
lack of independence of external auditors in China and that China’s weak institutional 
environment generally results in lower-quality audits by the Big 4 auditors (Ke, Lennox, 
and Xin 2015), it is questionable whether investors would find the risk disclosures supplied 
by auditors credible enough or provide incremental information for decision-making.  
                                                             
authors develop a model to evaluate the costs and benefits of  disclosing information about audit quality. They argue 
that when the underlying financial reporting quality is low, the investor uses the audit report primarily for its insurance 
value, which, in turn, enhances the auditor’s incentives to exert effort, because higher effort increases audit quality in 
expectation. To the extent that the additional risk disclosures are informative about audit quality and induces audit 
quality, this can enhance the decision-usefulness of  financial reports for the investor. 
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  Based on the above opposing arguments, we formulate our hypothesis in the null 
form: 
H1: Holding other factors constant, the risk disclosures in the expanded audit report is not 
incrementally informative. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Pre-post Adoption and Difference-in-Differences model (DD)  
As highlighted earlier, A+H share firms (i.e. firms that are listed on both the 
Mainland China and Hong Kong stock exchanges) are required to issue the expanded audit 
report after 1 Jan 2017 (i.e., fiscal years 2016 and after), and all other A share firms (i.e., 
firms that are only listed on the Mainland China stock exchange) are only required to do 
so after 1 Jan 2018 (i.e., fiscal years 2017 and after).4 We exploit this staggered adoption of 
the expanded audit report in China to examine the informativeness of the report, using 
alternative research designs (see Figure 1). 
First, we employ a pre-post design and focus on the full sample (i.e., using firm-
year observations from fiscal years 2014 to 2018) to examine the adoption effect of the 
expanded audit report. This design allows us to examine whether our variables of interests 
(e.g., market reaction, trading volume, etc.,) change from pre- to post-adoption of the 
expanded audit report for both A+H share and A share firms. Accordingly, we specify an 
indicator variable POST that equals to 1 for A+H share firms in fiscal years 2016, 2017 
and 2018, and equals to 1 for A share firms in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, and 0 otherwise.  
                                                             
4 In China, all listed firms have fiscal year ending 31 December and are required to issue their annual reports 
before 30 April of  the following year.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432107
  19 / 64 
 
 
 
Second, we employ two separate DD models to mitigate the effect of time-related 
trends contemporary with the expanded audit report, including economic, political, and 
other factors, by focusing on the first-year adoption effect. Our first sample “D1” focuses 
on firm-year observations from fiscal years 2014 to 2016, whereby we use the A+H share 
firms as the treatment group and the other A share firms as the control group. Accordingly, 
we code an indicator variable TREAT that equals to 1 for A+H share firms, and 0 for A 
share firms. We also redefine the indicator variable POST to equal to 1 for fiscal year 2016, 
and 0 for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Our second sample “D2” uses firm-year observations 
from fiscal years 2016 and 2017 only, and the A share firms become the treatment group 
while the A+H share firms becomes the control group. Accordingly, we redefine the 
indicator variable TREAT to equal to 1 for A share firms, and 0 for A+H share firms; the 
indicator variable POST equals to 1 for fiscal year 2017, and 0 for fiscal year 2016.  
Market Reaction Tests 
Following Gutierrez et al. (2018), we employ two main proxies for investors’ 
reaction to the expanded audit report:  (1) the three-day cumulative absolute abnormal 
returns in the period surrounding the date on which the annual report, containing the audit 
report, is publicly distributed (i.e., the report filing date)5 and (2) the sum of three-day 
abnormal trading volume around the report filing date. Absolute abnormal returns reflect 
the average change in investors’ belief due to an announcement event and trading volume 
is the “most visible indicator of investors’ response to public disclosures” (Miller 2010). 
Greater usefulness of the expanded audit report will be reflected in positive price reactions 
                                                             
5 In China, the audit report is released together with the annual report, which includes the financial statement. 
In other words, investors obtain the audited financial information and audit report simultaneously.  
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and an increase in abnormal trading volume on the report filing date. We estimate the pre-
post and DD models as follows: 
ABCAR （AVOL） = δ POST +(βABCAR) + β1LnMV + β2LEV + β3MTB + 
β4INST + β5Analysts + β6ΔEPS + β7ROA + β8MAO + β9SDRET + β10BETA +Industry 
FE + Audit firm FE + ε        
  (1.1) 
 
ABCAR （ AVOL） = βTREAT + δ1POST + δ2TREAT*POST +(βABCAR) 
+β1LnMV + β2LEV + β3MTB + β4INST + β5Analysts + β6ΔEPS + β7ROA + β8MAO 
+ β9SDRET + β10BETA  +Industry FE + Audit firm FE + ε   
 (1.2) 
 
We calculate (1) ABCAR as the sum of the three-day absolute abnormal returns 
around the release date of the audit report, with abnormal return of each day calculated as 
the company returns = (Price Closet – Price Closet-1)/Price Closet-1 minus the same-day 
returns for the whole A share value-weighted portfolio, and (2) AVOL as the firm’s 
average event-period volume minus same-day A share average trading volume (scaled by 
outstanding shares).  
We control for firm characteristics such as market value of firm (LnMV), leverage 
(LEV), market-to-book (MTB), the level of institutional holdings (INST), the number of 
analysts following the firm (Analysts), firm performance (ΔEPS and ROA), the presence 
of modified auditor opinion (MAO), and firm risk using the standard deviation of stock 
return (SDRET) and firm beta (BETA). When the dependent variable is AVOL, we 
further include ABCAR, which is an important factor related to trading behaviour (Bamber, 
Barron, and Stevens, 2011). We include industry and audit firm fixed effects in all the above 
models to account for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and audit firms.6 We 
                                                             
6 Our results are qualitatively similar when we include firm fixed effects. Following Gutierrez et al. (2018), 
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estimate all models using OLS and obtain t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by 
firm and the announcement date of report.7  
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) Tests 
According to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), the information content of the 
earnings report should increase as investors’ perceived information credibility increases. 
Hence, to the extent that the risk disclosures in the expanded audit report enhance investor 
perceptions of the financial reporting quality, we expect a larger stock price reaction to 
unexpected earnings after issuance of the expanded audit report. Hence, we test the 
following two regression models:  
CAR=χUE + δUE*POST + γ1POST + γ2LnMV + γ3MTB + γ4LEV + γ5CFO + 
γ6SDSales + γ7Analysts + γ8Loss + φ1UE*LnMV + φ2UE*MTB + φ3UE*LEV + 
φ4UE*CFO + φ5UE*SDSales +φ6UE*Analysts +φ7UE*Loss + Industry FE + Audit firm 
FE +ε          
   (2.1) 
 
CAR=χUE + δUE*POST*TREAT + γ1POST + γ2TREAT+ γ3POST*TREAT+ 
γ4 LnMV + γ5MTB + γ6LEV + γ7CFO + γ8SDSales + γ9Analysts + γ10Loss + 
φ1UE*POST + φ2UE*TREAT + φ3UE*LnMV + φ4UE*MTB + φ5UE*LEV 
+φ6UE*CFO + φ7UE*SDSales + φ8UE*Analysts +φ9UE*Loss + Industry FE + Audit 
firm FE +ε   (2.2) 
 
 
The dependent variable is CAR, which is the cumulative abnormal return as 
described before but without taking the absolute value. UE, which is the unexpected 
earnings (or earning surprise), is calculated as the change of earnings per share over the 
year, deflated by prior year’s ending stock price. Following Reid et al. (2019), we control 
                                                             
we also calculate standard errors using the bootstrap method with 1,000 replications, given that the 
theoretical distribution of  the test statistic is unknown and the sample sizes are small. Results are qualitatively 
similar. 
7 We cluster by announcement date because Chinese listed companies are likely to issue annual reports 
from the middle to end of  April (the due date is April 30) and hence their market reactions could be 
correlated. 
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for firm-specific variables that have been shown to be associated with ERC, namely the 
market value of the firm (LnMV), market-to-book (MTB), leverage (LEV), net operating 
cashflow (CFO), sales volatility (SDSales), the number of analysts following the firm 
(Analysts), and a loss indicator (Loss).8 We further control for the interaction of UE and 
the control variables. As before, industry and audit firm fixed effects are included in the 
above models. 
Stock Price Synchronicity Tests 
If there is a limited supply of firm-specific information to the market, the firm-
level stock return is expected to be highly correlated with the market return and there 
would be high price synchronicity (Roll 1988). Jin and Myers (2006) find that Chinese firms 
displayed the highest level of stock return synchronicity out of the 40 countries included 
in their study, which suggests the limited supply of firm-specific information among 
Chinese firms. To the extent that the risk disclosures in the expanded audit report better 
direct investors’ attention to key financial reporting areas and identify areas that deserve 
more attention (PCAOB 2017), we expect the risk disclosures to facilitate the flow of firm-
specific information into the market, thus motivating investors to rely more (less) on firm-
specific (common) information in their trading decisions. 9  Consequently, stock price 
                                                             
8 We follow previous studies and calculate unexpected earnings using last years’ earnings as benchmark in 
our main tests (e.g., Guan, Su, Wu and Yang, 2016). We obtain qualitatively similar results using analysts’ 
forecasts as benchmark.  
9 The PCAOB believes that the information provided in critical audit matters would be used by various types 
of  investors in a number of  different ways such as "informing" and “framing”. Framing” refers to the notion 
that critical audit matters would provide investors with a new perspective on the financial statements and 
focus their attention on the related financial statement accounts and disclosures, which should facilitate their 
analysis of  the financial statements, for example by highlighting potentially relevant information or by 
reducing the costs to process or search for the information. Consistent with this “framing” view, Sirois, 
Bédard, and Bera (2018) find that KAMs have attention directing impact, in that participants access KAMs-
related disclosures more rapidly and pay relatively more attention to them when KAMs are communicated 
in the auditor’s report. 
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synchronicity should decrease after adoption of the expanded audit report. Our regression 
specifications are as follows:  
SYNC= δPOST + β1TOPHOLD + β2TOPHOLD2+ β3QFII + β4BSHARE + 
β5SOE + β6SIZE + β7MTB + β8LEV+ β9VOL+ β10ROA + Industry FE + Audit firm 
FE +ε          
  (3.1) 
SYNC= βTREAT +δTREAT*POST + β1TOPHOLD + β2TOPHOLD2+ β3QFII 
+ β4BSHARE + β5SOE + β6SIZE + β7MTB + β8LEV+ β9VOL+ β10ROA + Industry 
FE + Audit firm FE + ε        
  (3.2) 
 
We calculate stock price synchronicity (SYNC) by estimating the R2 (i.e., the 
goodness of fit) of the stock return regression as in Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010), whereby 
the estimation window is the 30 business days after the release of the audit report.10 We 
then obtain SYNC =Ln (R2/ (1- R2)).11 Following Gul et al. (2010), we control for factors 
that are associated with stock price synchronicity. We include the percentage of top one 
shareholder (TOPHOLD) and its square (TOPHOLD2) to capture the inverted U relation 
between stock price synchronicity and the ownership concentration. Further, we control 
for foreign holding using the percentage of qualified foreign investor holding (QFII) and 
the issue of A+B share (BSHARE).12 We also include state-owned enterprise (SOE) which 
is found to be positively related to stock price synchronicity. Other control variables 
                                                             
10 We run the regression R𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where Rit is the daily stock 
return for a given firm, Rmt is the daily stock return for the entire A share market, and Rindt is the daily average 
stock return for a given industry. 
11 Since R2 value is bounded between 0 and 1 and the regression cannot be estimated using OLS (Wooldridge 
2011), we use SYNC as the dependent variable.  
12 A+B share firms are firms that are not only listed on the China mainland stock exchange, but are also 
listed for trading to primarily international investors in U.S. Dollars as in the Shanghai exchange, or Hong 
Kong Dollars as in the Shenzhen exchange. 
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include the firm size measured by total assets (SIZE), market-to-book (MTB), leverage 
(LEV), average stock turnover (VOL), and ROA. 
Sample Selection  
We obtain accounting and market data from CSMAR and WIND database. Panel 
A of Table 1 presents our sample selection procedure. We began by considering all A share 
firms (15,679 observations) in China from fiscal years 2014 to 2018.  We retain firms that 
are publicly traded before 2014 to make sure that firms have complete audited financial 
information. After deleting non-financial firms and firms with missing required variables, 
we have 7,325 firm-year observations, including 300 observations for A+H share firms (60 
unique firms) and 7,025 observations for A share firms (1,405 unique firms).  
As discussed earlier, D1 sample is used to examine the effect of the expanded audit 
report requirements for A+H share firms only, which are the early adopters. The sample 
period for this test is from fiscal years 2014 to 2016. Table 1 Panel A shows a total of 4,395 
firm-year observations, including 180 observations for A+H share firms and 4,215 
observations for A share firms.  Next, D2 sample is used to examine the effect of the 
expanded audit report requirements for A share firms only, that is, the late adopters. The 
sample period for this test spans from fiscal years 2016 to 2017. Panel A shows a total of 
2,930 firm-year observations, which consists of 120 observations for A+H share firms and 
2,810 observations for A share firms. Tabl1 1 Panel B, which presents the sample 
distribution by industry, indicates that our sample firms are mostly concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the tests of overall differences in mean for all variables used in 
the market reaction, ERCs and stock price synchronicity tests for our full sample (i.e., 
A+H and A share firms combined). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
percent and 99th percent level. We first provide the differences in the means in abnormal 
returns (ABCAR) and abnormal trading volume (AVOL) between pre-adoption period 
and post-adoption period. The table shows that abnormal trading volume (AVOL) 
increases from pre-adoption to post-adoption period, but there is no significant change in 
abnormal returns (ABCAR) over the same period. This result provides some preliminary 
evidence that market reacts more to the audit report, in terms of abnormal trading volume, 
after the new audit reporting requirement. In untabulated analyses of the D1 and D2 
sample, we find that ABCAR are not significantly different between the treatment group 
and control group. However, we find that the treatment group (A+H and A share firms 
for D1 and D2, respectively) experiences significantly greater increases in abnormal trading 
volume (AVOL) from the pre- to the post-adoption periods relative to the control group. 
As discussed earlier, if the new risk disclosures in the expanded audit report 
facilitate the flow of firm-specific information into the market, and thus motivate outside 
investors to rely more on firm-specific information in their trading decisions, stock price 
synchronicity should decrease after the adoption of the expanded audit report. Table 2 
shows that stock price synchronicity (SYNC) decreases from pre-adoption to post-
adoption period. Moreover, in untabulated analyses of the D1 and D2 samples, we find 
that while all firms experience decreases in stock price synchronicity (SYNC) after the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432107
  26 / 64 
 
 
 
adoption of the expanded audit report, the magnitude of decrease is significantly greater 
for the treatment firms than for the control firms. Taken together, these results provide 
some evidence that the expanded audit report provides more firm-specific information to 
investors. 
For the control variables used in our main regressions, we find that leverage, 
institutional ownership, analysts following, changes in EPS, systematic risk, and sales 
volatility are significantly greater in the post-adoption period relative to the pre-adoption 
period. On the other hand, market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, ROA, stock return 
volatility, operating cash flows, percentage of top 1 shareholder, and average stock 
turnover are significantly lower in the post-adoption relative to the pre-adoption period. 
These differences indicate the importance of performing a multivariate regression analysis.  
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results of Market Reaction Tests  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the regression results of our market reaction tests. 
Column (1) shows the results of estimating Model 1.1 using the full sample, and Columns 
(2) and (3) show the results of estimating Model 1.2 using D1 and D2 samples, respectively. 
The coefficients on POST (in Column 1), and on TREAT*POST (in Columns 2 and 3) are 
positive but not statistically significant at the conventional levels. In terms of control 
variables, market reaction to the expanded audit report is smaller for larger firms and firms 
with higher beta, but is larger for firms with higher analyst following, more profitable firms, 
firms with higher stock returns volatility, and firms with modified audit opinions. Hence, 
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H1 is not supported using market reaction as proxy for the informativeness of the audit 
report. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of estimating Models 1.1 and 1.2 for the 
abnormal trading volume tests. The panel reveals that the coefficients on POST (in Column 
1) and TREAT*POST (in Columns 2 and 3) are all positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.05), suggesting that abnormal trading volume of both the A+H and A share firms is 
greater after the adoption of the expanded audit reports. These results provide support for 
our contention in H1 that the expanded audit report contains new information that is 
useful to investors. With regards to control variables, we find that larger absolute CAR, 
smaller firm size, higher leverage, lower institutional holding, larger change in EPS, higher 
stock returns volatility, and lower beta are associated with higher abnormal trading volume. 
Results of ERC Tests 
Table 4 presents the regression results of estimating Models 2.1 and 2.2 for our 
ERC tests. We find that the coefficients on UE*POST (Column 1), and 
UE*TREAT*POST (Columns 2 and 3) are all positive and statistically significant (p<0.10), 
indicating that the market reacts more strongly to earnings surprise after the adoption of 
the expanded audit report for both the A+H and A share firms. Hence, these results are 
consistent with the expanded audit report enhancing investors’ perceptions of financial 
reporting quality, providing more support for H1 on the informativeness of the expanded 
audit report. With regard to the control variables, we find that firms with higher market-
to-book ratio firms have higher ERCs. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432107
  28 / 64 
 
 
 
Results of Stock Price Synchronicity 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating models 3.1 and 3.2. In Column (1), the 
coefficient on POST is significantly negative (p<0.10), suggesting that stock price 
synchronicity decreases after adoption of the expanded audit report. Columns (2) and (3) 
reveal that the coefficients on TREAT*POST are both significantly negative (p<0.10), 
suggesting that the decreases in stock price synchronicity for both A+H and A share firms 
after they first adopt the expanded audit report are greater than that of the control firms. 
Taken together, these results are consistent with the additional risk disclosures in the 
expanded audit report facilitaing the flow of firm-level specific information to capital 
market, thus enabling investors to focus on more firm-level information for decision-
making. This finding provides further support for H1 on the informativeness of the 
expanded audit report. 
Robustness checks 
Alternative measures of CAR, AVOL, ERC and SYNC 
We perform a number of robustness tests. For brevity, we only present the results 
of the variables of interests in Table 6. First, we measure cumulative abnormal returns 
using other alternative measures, such as signed cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), five-
days absolute cumulative abnormal returns (ABCAR[-2, 2]) and firm-specific adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (ABCARadj). Panel A shows that there are still no significant 
differences in the market reaction to the expanded audit report between the pre- and post-
adoption period. Next, we measure abnormal trading volume by five-days abnormal 
trading volume (AVOL[-2, 2]) and firm-specific abnormal trading volume adjusted by either 
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the mean (AVOLadj) or median value (AVOLadj_median) of trading volume over the estimation 
window. Panel B shows that abnormal trading volume based on the revised measures 
continue to be significantly greater in the post-adoption relative to the pre-adoption period. 
Panel C presents the results for the ERC analysis. We first validate our results using analysts’ 
forecast as earnings benchmark to measure unexpected earnings (Column 1), using robust 
regression instead of OLS (Column 2) and adding the non-linearity of unexpected earnings 
to the regression to address the concern about extreme value of unexpected earnings 
(Column 3) (Gipper, Leuz and Maffett 2019). Panel C shows that the coefficients on 
UEalternative*POST continue to be significantly positive across all specifications. Finally, Panel 
D presents the results of our stock price synchronicity tests. We measure SYNC using its 
original R2 as dependent variable instead of the transformed value as we have done 
previously (Column 1). We also consider a longer period of 90 days following the release 
of annual report in measuring SYNC (Column 2) and R2 (Column 3). We continue to find 
that stock price synchronicity is significantly smaller in post-adoption relative to the pre-
adoption period. Interestingly, the larger coefficients on POST compared to those in Table 
5 suggest that the firm-specific information contained in the expanded audit report may 
continue to be useful to investors beyond 30 days after the release of the annual report. 
Finally, in untabulated analyses, we find that our earlier results in Tables 3 to 5 using the 
D1 and D2 samples are also robust to the above alternative measures of abnormal trading 
volume, ERC, and stock price synchronicity, thus further supporting our hypothesis that 
the expanded audit report is informative to investors in the China setting.    
Entropy balancing and propensity score matching 
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One limitation of our earlier analyses is that the number and/or characteristics of 
the treatment firms are different from that of the control firms. Entropy balancing is a 
quasi-matching approach that re-weights each control observation so that post-weighting 
distributional properties of matched variables between the treatment and control 
observations are virtually identical, thereby ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller, 2012; 
McMullin and Schonberger, 2020). Hence, we examine the robustness of our results using 
entropy balancing technique.13 In Panel E1 of Table 6, we first show covariate balance 
after pre-adoption observations are reweighted to achieve the covariant balance (the first 
moment adjustment) via entropy balancing. Panel E2 of Table 6 then reports the results 
of the effects of expanded audit report on trading volume (AVOL), earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) and price synchronicity test (SYNC), respectively, using the new sample. 
The panel shows that the coefficients on POST (Columns 1 and 3) and POST*UE (Column 
2) remain statistically significant (p<0.10) with signs consistent with our earlier results in 
Tables 3 to 5.  
To further strengthen the robustness of our results, we next use a propensity score 
matching technique (PSM) for our pre-post analysis to examine the adoption effect of the 
expanded audit report.14 Panel F1 of Table 6 confirms that the matching variables are not 
significantly different between the treatment and control groups. Panel F2 reports the 
                                                             
13 Unlike standard matching procedures, entropy balancing preserves the size of  the control sample, which 
is important in studies with significant imbalance between the size of  treatment and control samples 
(Chapman, Miller, and White 2019; Shroff, Verdi, and Yost 2017; Ferri, Zheng, and Zou 2018). 
14 Because the number of A+H share firms are much greater than that of A share firms, we use a logit 
regression to estimate the probability of being an A+H share firms. The variables we include in the logit 
regression are shown in Panel F1. We then create a matched sample using the 1:5 nearest neighbor 
matching technique without replacement and a caliper set at 0.03 following Shipman, Swanquist and 
Whited (2017). 
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results of replicating Tables 3 to 5 using the PSM sample. We continue to find significant 
coefficients on POST (Columns 1 and 3) and POST*UE (Column 2). In sum, our results 
are robust to using both entropy balancing and PSM techniques. 
Parallel Trends Assumption 
One identifying assumption for the consistency of the difference-in-differences 
estimator is the parallel trends assumption: in the absence of treatment (i.e., the adoption 
of the expanded audit report), the treatment and control firms should experience parallel 
trends in the outcome variable (i.e., AVOL, ERC and SYNC). While the assumption is 
not directly testable (since the trend in those outcomes absent the 2016 or 2017 rules is 
not observable), we examine the trends prior to the event of interest similar to other studies 
using a difference-in-differences design (e.g. Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). To do so, 
we re-run the regressions in Tables 3 to 5, except that we include two indicators to capture 
FY2015 and FY2016 instead of POST (we still interact these indicators with the relevant 
variables, similar to the indicator POST). This test aims to assess the extent of differences 
in the variables of interest between the treatment and control groups in the years prior to 
the adoption of the expanded audit report. If the parallel trends assumption is not violated, 
we expect the coefficients on TREAT*FY2015 for the abnormal trading volume or stock 
price synchronicity test, and that on UE*TREAT*FY2015 for the ERC test, to be 
insignificant. Panel G of Table 6 reports these results that confirm that the parallel trend 
assumptions are supported. In addition, we conduct some placebo tests to confirm that 
our results are indeed due to the new regime by (1) using randomly-selected listed 
companies as the treatment group, and (2) using A+B instead of A+H share firms as the 
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“earlier adopter” treatment group (i.e. D1 sample test).15 All our earlier results in Tables 3 
to 5 disappear (untabulated), confirming that our findings are not driven by spurious 
factors. 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Cross-sectional Analysis - Demand of the Audit Report  
In our main analyses, we find that the expanded audit report is incrementally 
informative to investors in terms of higher abnormal trading volume, higher ERC, and 
lower price synchronicity. In this section, we attempt to gain further insights by examining 
whether the informativeness of the expanded audit report varies according to the demand 
of the audit report. As discussed earlier, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have lower 
demand for high quality audit than non-SOEs for control purposes (Piotroski and Wong 
2012; Wang, Wong, and Xia 2008). Hence, we expect investors in non-SOEs firms to be 
more likely to rely on the expanded audit report and its accompanying additional risks 
disclosure information for decision making relative to their counterparts in SOEs. To test 
our assertion, we use an indicator variable NSOE that equals to 1 if the controlling 
shareholder is not state-owned, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we expect investors’ demand 
for the risk disclosures information in the expanded audit report to be greater when there 
is higher information asymmetry in the firm (i.e., when the information environment is 
more opaque). Because smaller firms and firms with lower analyst following have poorer 
information environments (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993, 1996), we proxy for 
                                                             
15 A+B firms are defined earlier in footnote 8. We examine A+B firms as one of  the placebo tests because 
according to Ke et al. (2015), A+H and A+B share firms are similar in that they are both subject to dual 
accounting and auditing standards. 
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information asymmetry using (i) MV_median, which is an indicator variable that equals to 
1 if the firm’s market value is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise, and (2) 
Analysts_median, which is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the number of analysts 
following the firm is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. To examine the cross-
sectional variation, we include NSOE, MV_median, and Analysts_median, together with their 
interactions with POST into our full sample models. Table 7 presents the regression results.  
In Panel A, the coefficients on POST*NSOE, POST*MV_median, and 
POST*Analysts_median are all positive and statistically significant (p<0.05), suggesting that 
the increases in trading volume after the adoption of expanded audit report is larger for 
non-SOEs, smaller firms and firms with lower analyst following. In Panel B, we find that 
the coefficients on POST*NSOE*UE and POST*Analysts_median*UE are positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.10), while the coefficient on POST*MV_median*UE is positive 
but not significant at the conventionally level. These results suggest that the market 
reaction to unexpected earnings after the adoption of the expanded audit report is more 
pronounced for non-SOE firms and firms with lower analyst following. Finally, in Panel 
C, we find that the coefficients on POST*NSOE and POST*MV_median are negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.10), while the coefficient on POST*Analysts_median is negative 
but not significant at the conventional level. These results indicate that the decrease in 
stock price synchronicity after the adoption of the expanded audit report is more 
pronounced for non-SOE firms and smaller firms. Taken together, our results in this 
section provide some support that investors find the expanded audit report more 
informative when there is a greater demand for the expanded audit report. 
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Investor’s Attention to Expanded Audit Report (Relative to Annual Report) 
Audit reports are typically issued concurrently with annuals reports. In our earlier 
analyses, we attempt to isolate the effects of investors’ reactions to the expanded audit 
reports by using difference-in-differences research designs (i.e., we compare A+H share 
firms with expanded audit reports to A share firms with old audit reports while the annual 
report format remains the same in the pre- and post-adoption periods). To afford stronger 
inference that the investors’ reaction that we documented earlier are more likely 
attributable to the expanded audit reports rather than the annual reports, we examine the 
number of downloads of the audit reports relative to the number of downloads of the 
annual reports in both the pre- and post-adoption periods. The information “downloads” 
are obtained from the platform “JuChao” (“www.chinfo.com.cn”), in which all Chinese 
listed companies are required to timely disclose all their regulatory fillings or any 
announcements (i.e., annual report and audit report are separately disclosed). We define 
RD (i.e. relative downloads) as the number of downloads of auditor’s report divided by the 
number of downloads of annual report for each listed company and replace CAR in Model 
1.1 and 1.2 with RD.16 Table 8 presents the regression results. We find that the coefficients 
on POST and TREAT*POST are all positive and statistically significant (p<0.01), 
suggesting that audit reports downloads relative to annual reports downloads significantly 
increase in the post-adoption periods relative to the pre-adoption periods. This finding 
provides some support that the increased trading volume and ERC, as well as the decreased 
                                                             
16 We randomly select 200 firms from our full sample and calculate RD during the period 2014 to 2017. We 
find that these 200 firms have generally similar characteristics (e.g. LnMV and other control variables 
included in this table) as those in our main analyses.      
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stock price synchronicity, in the post-adoption periods are more likely due to the 
information content of the expanded audit report rather than the annual reports per se. 
Informativeness of Modified Audit Opinions 
Prior studies show that audit opinions are informative to investors (e.g., Chen, Su, 
and Zhao 2000; Ogneva and Subramanyam 2007; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan 2009; Menon 
and Williams 2010). Hence, if the expanded audit report is informative and useful to 
investors in evaluating financial reporting quality as we have earlier documented, we should 
expect the negative market reaction to modified audit opinions to be more pronounced in 
the post- relative to the pre-adoption periods as well. To test this hypothesis, we include 
MAO, an indicator variable that signifies if the audit opinion is modified (i.e., unqualified 
opinions with explanatory notes, qualified opinions, and disclaimers or adverse opinions) 
and its interaction with POST (i.e., MAO*POST) in Model 1.1 and present the regression 
results in Table 9. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on MAO*POST is significantly 
positive when ABCAR is the dependent variable, suggesting that the market reacts more 
strongly to modified audit opinions in the post-adoption periods. When we split ABCAR 
according to the direction of market reaction (Columns 2 and 3), we find that the issuance 
of modified audit opinions induces negative market reaction in the post-adoption period 
mainly in the sample of firms with negative CAR. This result suggests that when investors 
are perceiving modified audit opinions negatively, the additional risks disclosure 
information in the expanded audit report becomes more useful to investors in evaluating 
the implications of modified audit opinions; as a result, the negative market reaction to the 
modified audit opinions becomes stronger. Taken together, these results provide some 
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support for regulators’ expectation that the expanded audit report enables investors to 
better understand the auditor’s work.  
Effect of New Audit Reporting Requirements on Audit Quality 
Our earlier results suggest that the expanded audit report are informative to 
investors, which is consistent with regulators’ expectation that the new audit report should 
improve transparency and usefulness of the auditor’ work. In addition, increased oversight 
and investors’ attention on the auditor’s work may increase audit quality even though the 
new rule per se does not change specific rules on audit procedures. Hence, we examine 
whether the increased informativeness of the expanded audit report is at least partially due 
to an increase in audit quality.  
Our first proxy for audit quality is the value of the performance-adjusted accrual 
(DACC) in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005).17 We regress DACC on POST and other 
controls that have shown to affect accruals in prior studies (e.g. Reid et al., 2019). Table 
10 presents the results. We find that the coefficients on POST (Column 1) and 
TREAT*POST (Column 3) are significantly negative (p<0.10), while the coefficient of 
TREAT*POST (Column 2) is negative but not significant at the conventional level. These 
results provide some support that auditors curb discretionary accruals after the adoption 
of the expanded audit report. 
                                                             
17 Following Guan et al. (2016), we decompose total accruals into normal and discretionary components: 
TACC=α0+α11/TAST+α2ΔSales+α3PPE+α4ROA+ε, where TACC is total accruals defined as the difference 
between operating income and operating cash flow; ΔSales is growth in sales from year t-1 to year t; PPE 
represents the gross value of  fixed assets; and ROA is the net income. All the above variables are deflated by 
the average of  beginning and ending total assets, TAST. Following KLW, we also include a constant intercept 
term in our model.  
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Effect of New Audit Reporting Regime on Audit Fees 
Although there is no ex ante expectation that audit fees will increase upon the 
enactment of new audit rule, our earlier results suggest that auditors may exert more effort 
to select the most important audit matters to explain to investors. In addition, the 
heightened exposure and scrutiny to audit work should lead to an increase in audit fees. 
Hence, we examine whether audit fees increase in the post-adoption periods. Our measure 
of audit fees, LAF, is the logarithm of total fees paid to the auditor for audit services in 
each year. Table 11 reports the regression results when we replace CAR in Model 1.1 and 
1.2 with LAF, including other control variables that affect audit fees (e.g. Reid et al., 2019). 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient on POST is positive and significant (p<0.01), 
indicating that firms pay higher audit fees in the post-adoption periods relative to the pre-
adoption periods, after controlling for such factors as size, profitability, and complexity. 
The coefficient on TREAT*POST is positive and significant in Column 3 (p<0.05) but 
not in Column 2. These results suggest that audit fees for A share firms increase after the 
initial adoption of the expanded audit report. Together with the results in the preceding 
section, this finding suggests that the informativeness of the expanded audit report could 
be in part due to an increase in the quality of the auditor’s work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine the informativeness of the expanded audit report in the 
setting of an emerging economy. We hypothesize that the poor information environment 
and the prevalence of earnings management in China engender a greater demand for the 
risk disclosures information in the expanded audit report, and consequently, investors 
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would find the new report incrementally informative. Exploiting the staggered adoption 
of the expanded audit report in China and using both pre-post and difference-in-
differences research designs, we find that abnormal trading volume and ERC increase, and 
stock price synchronicity decreases, in the post-adoption periods compared to the pre-
adoption periods. These results are robust to various alterative measures of abnormal 
trading volume, ERC, and stock price synchronicity. They are also robust to using entropy 
balancing technique and PSM method. We also test the parallel trend assumption and find 
supportive evidence. 
We conduct additional analyses to enrich our analyses. First, we examine whether 
investors would find the expanded audit report more informative in circumstances where 
there is a greater demand for the information in the audit report for decision making. We 
find that the expanded audit report is more informative for non-SOEs and for firms with 
higher information asymmetry. Second, we investigate and find that audit reports 
downloads relative to annual reports downloads significantly increase in the post-adoption 
periods. This finding provides further support that the capital market effects that we 
document earlier are more likely attributable to the information content of the expanded 
audit report rather than the annual reports. Third, we also find that the expanded audit 
report is more informative in terms of helping investors understand the implications of 
modified audit opinions. Finally, we document that the value of discretionary accruals 
decreases and audit fees increase in the post periods, suggesting that the increased 
informativeness of the expanded audit report is at least partially due to an increase in the 
quality of the auditor’s work.  
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To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the informativeness 
of the auditor risk disclosures in an emerging economy. Our findings extend and 
complement existing studies such as Gutierrez et al., (2018) and Lennox et al. (2018) who 
generally find the lack of informativeness of the expanded audit report in a large and 
developed economy such as the U.K. Together, their studies and our study can help inform 
standard-setters and regulators around the world, especially those in developing economies, 
who would otherwise be skeptical about the usefulness of the risk disclosures in the 
expanded audit report. Our findings should also be useful to standard-setters in terms of 
issuing implementation guidance and conducting post-implementation review. 
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Figure 1 
Timeline of Research Design 
Mandate for A+H 
share companies: 
01/01/2017 
Mandate for other A 
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TABLE 1 
Sample 
Panel A Sample selection process 
Sample selection criteria Firm-years from 
FY2014 to 2018 
(Full sample) 
Firm-years from 
FY2014 to 2016 
(D1 sample) 
Firm-years from 
FY2016 to 2017 
(D2 sample) 
All listed companies in China A share 15,679 8,268 6,512 
Retained: companies listed before 
2014 
12,200 7,320 4,880 
Retained: non-financial companies 11,870 7,122 4,748 
Retained: non-missing data to 
calculate stock return, trading volume, 
and stock price synchronicity around the 
release of the report. 
10,661 6,234 4,284 
Retained: all data exists for five years, 
i.e. a balanced panel sample. 
7,325 4,395 2,930 
Final sample 7,325 4,395 2,930 
A+H share firms 300 (=60*5) 180 (=60*3) 120 (=60*2) 
other A share firms 7,025 (=1405*5) 4,215 (=1405*3) 2,810 (=1405*2) 
 
Panel B Sample distribution by industry 
Industry classification by China regulator (CSRC) Composition in  
final sample 
Composition in i
nitial sample 
 
A  Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 1.57% 1.10% 
B Mining 3.07% 2.06% 
C1 Manufacturing sector1 6.62% 6.05% 
C2 Manufacturing sector2 18.43% 18.08% 
C3 Manufacturing sector3 35.43% 36.74% 
C4 Manufacturing sector4 1.37% 1.97% 
D  Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply 4.30% 2.91% 
E Construction 2.73% 2.54% 
F Wholesale and retail trade 5.60% 4.42% 
G  Transportation, warehousing and postal services 4.16% 2.76% 
H Accommodation and Catering 0.34% 0.24% 
I  Software and Information Technology Services 6.14% 7.83% 
J Financials N/A 2.89% 
K Real estate 4.85% 3.35% 
L Leasing and business services 1.23% 1.44% 
M  Scientific research and technical services 0.68% 1.54% 
N Water conservancy and public facilities management 1.16% 1.37% 
O Residential services, repairs and other services N/A 0.03% 
P Education 0.27% 0.21% 
Q Health and social work 0.27% 0.32% 
R Culture, sports and entertainment 1.16% 1.58% 
S Others 0.61% 0.58% 
 100% 100% 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics Comparing Pre-adoption vs. Post-adoption periods 
 Post adoption period (2990 obs.) Pre-adoption period (4335 obs.)    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(3)  
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean diff.   
Market Reaction Analyses  
ABCAR 0.036 0.026 0.036 0.027 -0.001   
AVOL 0.006 -0.220 -0.096 -0.427 0.103 ***  
LnMV 22.78 22.59 22.95 22.83 -0.174 ***  
LEV 0.440 0.436 0.427 0.417 0.013 ***  
INST 0.446 0.463 0.433 0.451 0.013 **  
Analysts 5.087 2.000 4.621 3.000 0.466 ***  
MTB 2.643 2.008 4.616 3.535 -1.974 ***  
ΔEPS -0.318 0.027 -0.488 -0.104 0.170 **  
ROA 0.040 0.035 0.043 0.036 -0.004 ***  
SDRET 0.359 0.343 0.524 0.476 -0.165 ***  
BETA 1.237 1.203 1.012 1.084 0.224 ***  
MAO 0.017 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.004   
Earnings Response Coefficient Analyses  
CAR 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.001   
UE -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 ***  
CFO 0.045 0.044 0.050 0.048 -0.005 ***  
SDSales 0.171 0.038 0.089 0.022 0.083 ***  
Loss 0.079 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.010 *  
Price Synchronicity Analyses 
SYNC 0.065 0.086 0.157 0.215 -0.092 ***  
TOPHOLD 0.337 0.318 0.351 0.333 -0.014 ***  
TOPHOLD2 0.134 0.101 0.145 0.111 -0.012 ***  
QFII 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000   
SIZE 22.76 22.58 22.37 22.19 0.393 ***  
VOL 1.494 1.451 2.208 2.235 -0.714 ***  
SOE 0.457 0.000 0.444 0.000 0.014   
BSHARE 0.038 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000   
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of our variables of interests and control variables in pre-adoption vs. post-
adoption period, and t-tests of the differences between the two groups. Variable definitions are detailed in the 
Appendix. Mean difference T-test are provided: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
Market Reaction Analyses 
Panel A Stock price reaction to the issuance of expanded audit report 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Differences analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = ABCAR ABCAR ABCAR 
TREAT  0.0023 0.0013 
  (0.996) (0.311) 
POST 0.0022 -0.0074*** -0.0010 
 (1.152) (-3.718) (-0.181) 
TREAT*POST  0.0028 0.0063 
  (0.642) (1.216) 
LnMV -0.0053*** -0.0065*** -0.0013 
 (-7.270) (-7.756) (-1.341) 
LEV 0.0018 0.0022 0.0024 
 (0.682) (0.680) (0.718) 
INST -0.0023 -0.0035 -0.0044 
 (-1.185) (-1.418) (-1.507) 
Analysts 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0001 
 (3.659) (2.158) (0.909) 
MTB 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004** 
 (0.315) (0.966) (2.322) 
ΔEPS -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.476) (-0.206) (0.280) 
ROA 0.0069 0.0279* 0.0311* 
 (0.483) (1.953) (1.742) 
SDRET 0.0109*** -0.0041 0.0218*** 
 (2.658) (-0.833) (3.447) 
BETA -0.0084*** -0.0047*** -0.0039*** 
 (-6.974) (-2.602) (-2.869) 
MAO 0.0094* -0.0031 -0.0016 
 (1.792) (-0.659) (-0.359) 
Constant 0.1594*** 0.1917*** 0.0518** 
 (9.308) (9.701) (2.261) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 4395 2930 
R2 0.041 0.068 0.044 
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Panel B Abnormal trading volume around the issuance of expanded audit report 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Differences analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = AVOL AVOL AVOL 
TREAT  -0.0402 0.0720 
  (-0.595) (0.906) 
POST 0.1543*** 0.2274*** 0.0657 
 (3.350) (4.603) (1.051) 
TREAT*POST  0.2232** 0.0463*** 
  (2.597) (3.530) 
ABCAR 9.2692*** 7.6771*** 11.7177*** 
 (15.313) (11.847) (20.656) 
LnMV -0.1853*** -0.1662*** -0.1773*** 
 (-9.560) (-6.062) (-7.037) 
LEV 0.3126*** 0.2909*** 0.1736* 
 (3.523) (2.735) (1.658) 
INST -0.7055*** -0.7961*** -0.3064*** 
 (-8.969) (-8.206) (-3.480) 
Analysts 0.0021 -0.0028 0.0065** 
 (0.843) (-0.775) (2.486) 
MTB -0.0006 0.0044 -0.0048 
 (-0.120) (0.800) (-1.029) 
ΔEPS 0.0145*** 0.0201*** 0.0082 
 (4.157) (4.423) (1.271) 
ROA -0.4870 -1.7668*** -0.3838 
 (-1.310) (-4.002) (-0.849) 
SDRET 1.0448*** 0.5961*** 0.8863*** 
 (9.499) (4.488) (3.959) 
BETA -0.1002*** -0.0757 -0.0679* 
 (-3.307) (-1.555) (-1.826) 
MAO 0.0796 0.1101 0.1070 
 (0.612) (0.720) (0.615) 
Constant 3.7279*** 3.7120*** 3.4080*** 
 (8.679) (6.130) (5.698) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 4395 2930 
R2 0.260 0.241 0.295 
Table 3 reports the regression results of the analyses on the market reaction to expanded audit reports. The 
dependent variable is absolute cumulative abnormal returns (ABCAR) in Panel A, and abnormal trading volume 
(AVOL) in Panel B. In both panels, Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H 
share firms as treatment firms), and D2 sample (i.e., A share firms as treatment firms), respectively. All t-statistics 
are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and 
are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Earnings Response Coefficient Analyses 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Difference analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = CAR CAR CAR 
UE 0.0000 -0.9369 0.3428 
 (-1.186) (-0.572) (0.000) 
POST 0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0044 
 (0.447) (-1.287) (-1.015) 
TREAT  -0.0034 0.0007 
  (-0.785) (0.161) 
UE*TREAT  0.2311 -0.3151 
  (1.228) (-1.273) 
UE*POST 0.1878** -0.0101 -0.3152 
 (2.185) (-0.115) (-0.805) 
POST*TREAT  0.0069 0.0108** 
  (1.041) (2.033) 
UE*POST*TREAT  0.0638* 0.4759** 
  (1.730) (2.215) 
LnMV 0.0027** 0.0032* 0.0023 
 (2.062) (1.865) (1.274) 
LnMV*UE 0.0590 0.0326 -0.0085 
 (1.146) (0.463) (-0.111) 
MTB 0.0004* 0.0002 -0.0001 
 (1.795) (0.861) (-0.427) 
MTB*UE 0.0294* 0.0384** 0.0454 
 (1.821) (1.982) (1.564) 
LEV 0.0003 0.0029 0.0020 
 (0.069) (0.642) (0.386) 
LEV*UE -0.1053 0.0684 0.0343 
 (-0.561) (0.244) (0.131) 
CFO 0.0073 0.0090 0.0130 
 (0.778) (0.768) (1.054) 
CFO*UE -0.4109 0.1506 -0.0688 
 (-0.761) (0.208) (-0.081) 
SDSales -0.0042** -0.0021 -0.0035 
 (-2.327) (-0.595) (-1.092) 
SDSales*UE -0.0413 -0.0410 -0.0060 
 (-0.422) (-0.175) (-0.050) 
Analysts 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.618) (0.066) (0.838) 
Analysts *UE 0.0057 0.0070 0.0089 
 (0.660) (0.692) (0.922) 
Loss -0.0056 0.0022 0.0022 
 (-1.265) (0.539) (0.340) 
Loss*UE -0.1770 0.0461 -0.1333 
 (-1.408) (0.296) (-0.565) 
Constant -0.0636** -0.0737* -0.0568 
 (-2.081) (-1.834) (-1.352) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 4395 2930 
R2 0.017 0.022 0.031 
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Table 4 reports the regression results of the earnings response coefficients around the issuance of expanded audit 
reports. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on 
the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and D2 sample (i.e., A share firms as 
treatment firms), respectively. T-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual 
report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5  
Price Synchronicity Analyses 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Difference analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = SYNC SYNC SYNC 
TREAT  -0.0251 0.2550*** 
  (-0.274) (2.625) 
POST -0.0442* -0.6374*** 0.5523 
 (-1.997) (-15.041) (1.171) 
TREAT*POST  -0.2460** -0.2747* 
  (-2.018) (-1.896) 
TOPHOLD 0.0708 0.0159 0.5646 
 (0.225) (0.040) (1.207) 
TOPHOLD2 -0.3119 -0.2922 -0.9546 
 (-0.778) (-0.595) (-1.537) 
QFII -3.9682*** -4.5868*** -5.4168*** 
 (-3.202) (-3.513) (-2.803) 
SIZE -0.0362** -0.0432** -0.0487** 
 (-2.100) (-2.131) (-2.048) 
MTB -0.0309*** -0.0259*** -0.0411*** 
 (-6.291) (-5.539) (-5.992) 
LEV 0.0517 -0.0196 -0.0117 
 (0.639) (-0.226) (-0.101) 
VOL 0.1276*** 0.1195*** 0.2332*** 
 (4.167) (3.708) (6.993) 
ROA 0.1382 -0.4126 -1.0948** 
 (0.502) (-1.015) (-2.357) 
SOE 0.1134*** 0.0938*** 0.1004*** 
 (4.469) (3.308) (2.891) 
BSHARE -0.1009* -0.1180** -0.1088 
 (-1.885) (-1.996) (-1.463) 
Constant 0.7770** 1.2198*** 0.2154 
 (1.982) (2.612) (0.376) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 4395 2930 
R2 0.061 0.219 0.158 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the stock price synchronicity around the issuance of expanded audit 
reports. The dependent variable is stock price synchronicity (SYNC). Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on the 
full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and D2 sample (i.e., A share firms as treatment 
firms), respectively. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s 
announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Panel A Alternative measures of cumulative abnormal returns 
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= Signed CAR ABCAR[-2,2] ABCARadj 
POST 0.0006 0.0027 0.0022 
 (0.208) (1.288) (1.210) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.015 0.044 0.039 
This panel reports the results of market reaction to expanded audit reports, using various alternative measures of 
cumulative abnormal returns. Column (1) is based on unsigned CAR. Column (2) is based on ABCAR[-2, 2], which 
is estimated in the five-day window surrounding the issuance of the expanded audit report. Column (3) is based 
on firm-specific adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. For brevity, we only present the results for our variables 
of interests. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s 
announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B Alternative measures of abnormal trading volume  
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= AVOL[-2, 2] AVOLadj AVOLadj_median 
POST 0.1690*** 0.1783*** 0.1582*** 
 (3.164) (3.350) (2.680) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.255 0.202 0.198 
This panel reports the results of abnormal trading volume around the issuance expanded audit reports, using 
various alternative measures of abnormal trading volume. Column (1) is based on AVOL[-2, 2], which is estimated 
in the five-day window around the issuance of the expanded audit report. Column (2) is based on firm-specific 
adjusted AVOLadj. Column (3) is based on AVOLmedian-adj, which is similar to AVOLadj except that it uses median 
value, instead of mean value, of trading volume over the estimation window. For brevity, we only present the 
results for our variables of interests. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and 
annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel C Alternative measures of ERC  
 (1) Full sample  (2) Full sample (3) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= CAR  CAR CAR 
UEalternative -7.5653** UE -0.9823 -1.4531 
 (-2.167)  (-0.946) (-1.228) 
POST 0.0060** EAR 0.0025** 0.0008 
 (2.086)  (2.219) (0.290) 
UEalternative*POST 0.2131** UE*POST 0.2072*** 0.4613*** 
 (2.271)  (3.209) (2.994) 
  NLUE  -0.8954 
    (-0.299) 
  NLUE*EAR  -7.1216* 
    (-1.882) 
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Controls Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes  No Yes 
Obs. 4370  7325 7325 
R2 0.033  0.026 0.018 
This panel reports results of the ERCs around the issuance of expanded audit reports, using alternative 
specifications to capture ERCs. Column (1) is based on UEalternative, which uses prior-disclosure analysts’ forecasts 
as earnings benchmark. Column (2) is based on UE but is estimated using robust regression. Column (3) is based 
on further controlling for NLUE (i.e. UE times absolute value of UE) and its interaction with POST. For brevity, 
we only present the results for our variables of interests. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors 
adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel D Measurement issue related to price synchronicity 
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample (4) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= Rsquare SYNC[0, 90] Rsquare [0, 90] SYNC 
POST -0.0117** -0.1672*** -0.0402*** -0.0402* 
 (-2.212) (-2.600) (-2.826) (-1.852) 
AVOL    -0.0315*** 
    (-2.859) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.061 0.074 0.074 0.063 
This panel reports the results of stock price synchronicity around the release of expanded audit reports, using 
various alternative measures of stock price synchronicity. Column (1) is based on Rsquare, i.e., raw R2. Column 
(2) is based on SYNC[0, 90], which is estimated over 90 days following the issuance of expanded audit reports. 
Column (3) is based on Rsquare[0, 90] , i.e. , raw R2 relating to SYNC[0, 90]. Column (4) is based on SYNC but further 
controlling for abnormal trading volume. For brevity, we only present the results for our variables of interests. 
All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date 
clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel E1 Covariate balance after Entropy Balancing 
 Pre-adoption period   
Post-adoption 
period   
Control Variables Mean  Mean  Mean Diff 
LnMV 22.78  22.78  0.000 
LEV 0.440  0.440  0.000 
INST 0.446  0.446  0.000 
Analysts 5.087  5.087  0.000 
MTB 2.643  2.643  0.000 
ΔEPS -0.318  -0.318  0.000 
ROA 0.039  0.039  0.000 
SDRET 0.359  0.359  0.000 
BETA 1.237  1.237  0.000 
MAO 0.017  0.017  0.000 
Entropy balancing is a quasi-matching approach which re-weights each control observation so that post-
weighting distributional properties of matched variables of treatment and control observations are virtually 
identical, thereby ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller 2012; McMullin and Schonberger 2015). This panel 
reports the matched variables of treatment (i.e., pre-adoption period) and control (i.e., post-adoption period) 
observations to check for covariate balance.  
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Panel E2 Regression results using Entropy balancing 
 (1) Trading volume test (2) ERC test (3) Price synchronicity test 
Dep. Var.= AVOL CAR SYNC 
POST 0.1658** -2.1746 -0.1426** 
 (2.475) (-1.600) (-2.212) 
UE  -0.0019  
  (-0.700)  
POST*UE  0.1436*  
  (1.800)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.225 0.128 0.151 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of this panel reports the entropy balancing results of the three main tests, using AVOL, 
CAR and SYNC as dependent variable, respectively. For brevity, we only present the results for our variables of 
interests. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s 
announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel F1 Covariate balance after PSM 
 Treatment group  Control group    
Control Variables Mean  Mean  Mean Diff P-value 
LnMV 24.36  24.38  -0.018 0.814 
LEV 0.563  0.568  -0.004 0.766 
INST 0.677  0.663  0.014 0.354 
Analysts 8.544  8.308  0.236 0.681 
MTB 2.625  2.636  -0.011 0.963 
ΔEPS -0.461  -0.374  -0.087 0.771 
ROA 0.039  0.041  -0.002 0.664 
SDRET 0.398  0.391  0.007 0.620 
BETA 1.060  1.079  -0.019 0.587 
MAO 0.004  0.004  -0.001 0.893 
This panel reports covariate balance after propensity score matching (PSM) procedure. We first use a logit 
regression to estimate the probability of being a treatment firm (i.e. A+H share firm). The variables we include 
in the logit regression are covariate shown in this panel. We then create the matched sample using the 1:5 nearest 
neighbor matching technique without replacement and a caliper set at 0.03 following Shipman, Swanquist and 
Whited (2017). 
 
Panel F2 Regression results using PSM 
 (1) Trading volume test (2) ERC test (3) Price synchronicity test 
Dep. Var.= AVOL CAR SYNC 
POST 0.2479** 0.9483 -0.0864** 
 (2.303) (0.498) (-2.312) 
UE  0.0036  
  (1.384)  
POST*UE  0.2707*  
  (1.666)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1015 1015 1015 
R2 0.285 0.091 0.174 
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Columns (1), (2), and (3) of this panel reports the PSM results of the three main tests, using AVOL, CAR and 
SYNC as dependent variable, respectively. For brevity, we only present the results for our variables of interests. 
All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date 
clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel G Testing parallel trends assumption 
 (1) Trading volume test (2) ERC test (3) Price synchronicity test 
Dep. Var.= AVOL CAR SYNC 
FY2015*TREAT -0.0915 -0.0058 -0.1141 
 (-1.047) (-0.773) (-0.701) 
FY2016*TREAT 0.1930** 0.0005 -0.2513* 
 (2.545) (0.058) (-1.819) 
UE  -0.9652  
  (-0.517)  
UE*FY2015*TREAT  -0.7404  
  (-1.067)  
UE*FY2016*TREAT  0.2280*  
  (1.859)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4395 4395 4395 
R2 0.253 0.023 0.233 
This panel reports the regression results when we test for the parallel trends assumption. If the parallel trends 
assumption is supported, we expect the coefficient on FY2015*TREAT in Columns (1) or (3) or UE* 
FY2015*TREAT in Column (2) to be insignificant. Coefficients on industry and audit firm effects, interactions 
include FY2015*UE (FY2016*UE), TREAT*UE, TREAT, FY2015, and FY2016 are not tabulated for brevity. 
All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date 
clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Informativeness of the Expanded Audit Report – Moderating Effects of Non-SOE 
versus SOE firms, Firm Size, and Analyst Following 
Panel A Trading volume to issuance of report 
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= AVOL AVOL AVOL 
    
POST 0.1635** 0.1002** 0.0947** 
 (2.039) (2.408) (2.275) 
NSOE -0.0137   
 (-0.622)   
POST*NSOE 0.3178**   
 (2.193)   
MV_median  0.1598***  
  (4.082)  
POST* MV_median  0.1096**  
  (2.322)  
Analysts_median   0.1036*** 
   (2.928) 
POST* Analysts_median   0.1125** 
   (2.507) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.249 0.265 0.264 
 
 
Panel B ERC around the issuance of report 
 (1) Full sample (3) Full sample (5) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= CAR CAR CAR 
    
UE -0.0443 0.4544 1.5472 
 (-0.029) (0.243) (0.845) 
POST 0.0036 0.0004 0.0034 
 (1.541) (0.149) (1.189) 
UE* POST 0.0714 0.1594 0.0784 
 (0.693) (1.486) (0.702) 
NSOE 0.0160   
 (0.346)   
NSOE*UE -2.3455   
 (-1.085)   
POST*NSOE -0.0039   
 (-1.412)   
POST*NSOE*UE 0.2191*   
 (1.749)   
MV_median  -0.0664  
  (-0.907)  
MV_median *UE  -7.9862**  
  (-2.085)  
POST* MV_median  0.0025  
  (0.733)  
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POST*MV_median *UE  0.1392  
  (1.574)  
Analysts_median   0.0045 
   (0.094) 
Analysts_median*UE   -6.2971** 
   (-2.460) 
POST*Analysts_median   -0.0033 
   (-1.214) 
POST* Analysts_median 
*UE 
  0.1844* 
   (1.717) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.019 0.020 0.020 
 
Panel C Price synchronicity following the issuance of report 
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample 
Dep. Var.= SYNC SYNC SYNC 
    
POST -0.0108 -0.0181 -0.0526 
 (-0.390) (-0.290) (-0.852) 
NSOE -0.0877***   
 (-3.346)   
POST*NSOE -0.0622*   
 (-1.847)   
MV_median  0.1008***  
  (3.053)  
POST* MV_median  -0.0583**  
  (-2.352)  
Analysts_median   0.0547** 
   (2.005) 
POST* Analysts_median   -0.0139 
   (-1.586) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 7325 7325 
R2 0.062 0.063 0.062 
This table reports the regression results of the moderating effects of Non-SOE versus SOE firms, Firm Size, and 
Analyst Following on the informativeness of the expanded audit report, captured by AVOL (Panel A), CAR 
(Panel B) and SYNC (Panel C). NSOE is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is 
not state-owned, and 0 otherwise. MV_median is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s market value 
is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Analysts_median is an indicator that equals 1 if the number of analysts 
following the firm is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. For brevity, we only present the results for our 
variables of interests. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s 
announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Investor’s Attention to Audit Report Relative to Annual Report 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Difference analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = RD RD RD 
TREAT  0.0124 -0.0345* 
  (0.793) (-1.964) 
POST 0.0647*** 0.0058 0.0318*** 
 (14.642) (1.507) (2.665) 
TREAT*POST  0.0225*** 0.0345*** 
  (3.400) (2.772) 
LnMV -0.0055*** -0.0036 -0.0087** 
 (-2.638) (-1.449) (-2.392) 
LEV -0.0055 -0.0149 -0.0023 
 (-0.569) (-1.327) (-0.214) 
INST -0.0050 -0.0076 0.0058 
 (-0.594) (-0.854) (0.547) 
Analysts -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (-0.813) (-0.165) (-0.717) 
MTB 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.389) (0.700) (-0.679) 
ΔEPS 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0006 
 (0.077) (-0.244) (-0.803) 
ROA -0.0223 -0.0300 -0.0384 
 (-0.591) (-0.725) (-0.740) 
SDRET 0.0087 0.0027 0.0643*** 
 (0.927) (0.246) (2.785) 
BETA 0.0024 0.0020 -0.0076 
 (0.596) (0.452) (-1.156) 
MAO 0.0298* 0.0124 0.0529** 
 (1.889) (1.142) (2.242) 
Constant 0.1949*** 0.1576*** 0.2929*** 
 (4.335) (2.834) (3.354) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 788 591 394 
R2 0.450 0.219 0.500 
This table reports the regression results of investor’s attention to audit report (relative to annual report) before 
and after the issuance of expanded audit reports. The dependent variable is relative downloads (RD), measured 
by the number of downloads of the audit reports relative to the number of downloads of the annual reports. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and 
D2 sample (i.e., A share firms as treatment firms), respectively. All t-statistics are computed using the standard 
errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Informativeness of Modified Audit Opinions 
 (1) Full sample (2) CAR>=0 sample (3) CAR<0 sample 
Dep. Var. = ABCAR ABCAR ABCAR 
POST 0.0018 0.0028 0.0008 
 (0.969) (1.282) (0.334) 
MAO -0.0030 0.0006 -0.0069 
 (-0.666) (0.084) (-1.629) 
POST*MAO 0.0262*** 0.0272 0.0291*** 
 (2.944) (1.430) (2.965) 
LnMV -0.0054*** -0.0051*** -0.0057*** 
 (-7.375) (-4.472) (-6.655) 
LEV 0.0023 0.0027 0.0018 
 (0.852) (0.571) (0.600) 
INST -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0034 
 (-1.151) (-0.347) (-1.430) 
Analysts 0.0004*** 0.0003* 0.0005*** 
 (3.580) (1.794) (4.000) 
MTB 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 
 (0.556) (0.632) (-0.186) 
ΔEPS -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.447) (0.335) (-0.755) 
ROA 0.0086 0.0195 -0.0041 
 (0.610) (1.002) (-0.252) 
SDRET 0.0106*** 0.0117** 0.0094* 
 (2.634) (2.060) (1.926) 
BETA -0.0084*** -0.0076*** -0.0088*** 
 (-6.989) (-4.382) (-5.662) 
Constant 0.1600*** 0.1564*** 0.1662*** 
 (9.403) (5.993) (8.153) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7325 3351 3974 
R2 0.043 0.040 0.073 
This reports the regression results of the market reaction to modified audit opinions before and after the issuance 
of expanded audit reports. The dependent variable is absolute cumulative abnormal returns (ABCAR). Columns 
(1), (2), and (3) are based on the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and D2 sample 
(i.e., A share firms as treatment firms), respectively. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted 
for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
Effect of Expanded Audit Report Requirements on Audit Quality 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Difference analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = DACC DACC DACC 
TREAT  -0.0009 0.0046 
  (-0.354) (1.405) 
POST -0.0018* 0.0017 -0.0004 
 (-1.710) (1.606) (-0.100) 
TREAT*POST  -0.0003 -0.0084** 
  (-0.121) (-2.260) 
SIZE 0.0020*** 0.0006 0.0024*** 
 (3.697) (1.014) (2.869) 
ROA 0.3050*** 0.3144*** 0.3472*** 
 (22.060) (18.447) (18.630) 
Loss 0.0025* 0.0021 -0.0014 
 (1.658) (1.210) (-0.465) 
MTB -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0005 
 (-2.595) (-0.963) (-1.542) 
LEV 0.0124*** 0.0145*** 0.0134*** 
 (4.199) (4.041) (3.026) 
PRIOR_ACC -0.0235*** -0.0255*** -0.0353*** 
 (-4.153) (-3.720) (-4.457) 
CFO -0.8842*** -0.8820*** -0.8803*** 
 (-119.180) (-95.389) (-77.302) 
SDSales -0.0033** 0.0001 -0.0064*** 
 (-1.996) (0.034) (-2.688) 
Constant -0.0197* 0.0064 -0.0342* 
 (-1.745) (0.479) (-1.845) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7205 4381 2873 
R2 0.820 0.826 0.810 
This table reports the regression results of the discretionary accruals before and after the issuance of expanded 
audit reports. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DACC), measured as Kothari et al. (2005). 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and 
D2 sample (i.e., A share firms as treatment firms), respectively. All t-statistics are computed using the standard 
errors adjusted for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests.  ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Effect of Expanded Audit Report Requirements on Audit Fees 
 Pre-Post analyses Difference-in-Difference analyses 
 (1) Full sample (2) D1 sample (3) D2 sample 
Dep. Var. = LAF LAF LAF 
TREAT  0.5454*** -0.5910*** 
  (7.149) (-6.991) 
POST 0.0932*** 0.0333*** -0.1106* 
 (8.164) (4.243) (-1.842) 
TREAT*POST  0.0002 0.1612** 
  (0.003) (2.537) 
SIZE 0.4059*** 0.3901*** 0.3858*** 
 (30.306) (28.040) (27.093) 
ROA -1.1314*** -0.9104*** -0.7251** 
 (-5.458) (-3.904) (-2.397) 
Loss 0.0125 0.0273 0.0475 
 (0.488) (0.980) (1.212) 
MTB 0.0157*** 0.0141*** 0.0136*** 
 (5.497) (5.195) (3.487) 
CFO -0.0245 -0.0087 0.0208 
 (-0.383) (-0.135) (0.305) 
SDSales 0.2736*** 0.2990*** 0.2467* 
 (2.836) (2.846) (1.760) 
INV 0.1868*** 0.2322*** 0.1413*** 
 (5.942) (4.566) (3.963) 
REC -0.0930 -0.0572 -0.0992 
 (-1.030) (-0.660) (-0.933) 
Constant 4.6896*** 4.9948*** 5.7035*** 
 (16.081) (16.518) (17.092) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Audit firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Two-way Cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7305 4382 2923 
R2 0.712 0.734 0.717 
This table reports the regression results of audit fees before and after the issuance of expanded audit reports. 
The dependent variable is audit fees (LAF), measured as the natural log value of total audit fees. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) are based on the full sample, D1 sample (i.e., A+H share firms as treatment firms), and D2 sample 
(i.e., A share firms as treatment firms), respectively. All t-statistics are computed using the standard errors adjusted 
for firm and annual report’s announcement date clustering, and are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
ABCAR, CAR Absolute cumulative abnormal return is the absolute value of cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR). CAR is calculated as follow: 
∑ (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , where Rit is daily stock return adjusted by cash dividends, 
Rmt is the daily market return weighted by firms’ value. The event window 
T is the three-days [-1, 1] around the release of the audit report. 
ABCAR[-2, 2] 5-days absolute cumulative abnormal return, which is estimated as 
ABCAR except that the event window T is five-days [-2, 2] around the 
release of the audit report. 
ABCARadj Firm-specific adjusted absolute cumulative abnormal return is the absolute 
value of firm-specific adjusted cumulative abnormal return, which is 
calculated as follow: (1) we first estimate the correlation coefficients 
between Rit  (i.e. individual stock return) and Rmt (i.e. market stock return) 
during non-disclosure window, i.e., [-60, -11] prior to the release of the 
audit report, using the regression specification R𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1R𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, (2) we 
then obtain expected Rit’ by calculating 𝛼𝛼0��� +𝛼𝛼1���R𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖′ , over the event 
window [-1, 1] around the release of the audit report. (3) CAR is sum of 
abnormal return that R𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ − (𝛼𝛼0���+𝛼𝛼1���R𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖′) over [-1, 1] three days. 
Analysts The number of analysts following the firm. 
Analysts_median  An indicator that equals 1 if the number of analysts following the firm is 
below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
AVOL Abnormal trading volume calculated as follows: 
1
𝑇𝑇
∑ (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖 −
𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖
), where VOLit is firm i’s trading volume at day t, OSit 
is firm i's outstanding share at day t; MVOLt represents markets’ trading 
volume at day t, and MOSt represents markets’ outstanding share at day t. 
Event window T is the three-days window [-1, 1] around the release of the 
audit report. We standardize this variable. 
AVOL[-2, 2] 5-days abnormal trading volume, which is estimated as AVOL except that 
the event window T is five-days [-2, 2] around the release of the audit 
report. 
AVOLadj Firm-specific adjusted abnormal trading volume calculated as follows: Ln�1 𝑇𝑇1⁄ ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑇𝑇1𝑖𝑖1
1 𝑇𝑇2⁄ ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
𝑇𝑇2
𝑖𝑖2
�, where VOLit is firm i’s trading volume at day t, and 
the event window T1 is the three-days window [-1, 1] around the release of 
the audit report and the non-disclosure window T2 is the 50-days window 
[-60, -11] prior to the release of the audit report.  
AVOLadj_median Firm-specific median-adjusted abnormal trading volume calculated as 
follows: Ln� 1 𝑇𝑇1⁄ ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑇𝑇1𝑖𝑖1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇2 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2�, where VOLit is firm i’s trading volume 
at day t, and the event window T1 is the three-days window [-1, 1] around 
the release of the audit report and the non-disclosure window T2 is the 50-
days window [-60, -11] prior to the release of the audit report.  
BETA The slope coefficient of the regression of weekly stock returns on equal-
weighted market returns. 
BSHARE Indicator variable that equals to 1 if the A share firm also issues B shares 
(i.e. A+B share firms), and 0 otherwise. 
CFO The net operating cash flow divided by total asset. 
ΔEPS The change in basic earnings per share over the year. 
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DACC Discretionary accruals estimated using the methodology in Kothari et al. 
(2005). 
INV Inventory intensity measured by total inventory divided by total assets. 
INST The percentage of institutional holding shares, that is, institutional holding 
shares divided by total outstanding shares. 
LAF The natural log of audit fees. 
LEV Leverage ratio, computed as total liabilities divided by total assets at the 
end of the year. 
LnMV The natural logarithm of year-end market value. 
Loss Indicator variable that equals to 1 if net income is zero or negative, and 0 
otherwise. 
MAO Indicator variable that equals to 1 if the audit opinion is modified (i.e., 
unqualified opinions with explanatory notes, qualified opinions, and 
disclaimers or adverse opinions), and 0 otherwise. 
MTB Year-end market value divided by net equity value. 
MV_median An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s market value is below 
the sample median, and 0 otherwise.  
NSOE Indicator variable that equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is not 
state-owned, and 0 otherwise. 
POST For full sample, this indicator variable signifies the post-adoption periods 
of the expanded audit report. That is, it equals to 1 for A+H share firms in 
FY2016, FY2017, FY2018, or for other A share firms in FY2017, FY2018, 
and 0 otherwise. For D1 sample, this equals to 1 for FY2016, and 0 for 
FY2014 and FY2015. For D2 sample, this equals to 1 for FY2017, and 0 
for FY2016. 
PRIOR_ACC Total current accruals for the prior year (measured as net income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization less operating cash 
flows) scaled by total assets at the end of the prior year. 
QFII The percentage of qualified foreign investor holding. 
REC Accounts receivable intensity measured by total accounts receivable 
divided by total assets.  
RD The number of downloads of the auditor report divided by the number of 
downloads of annual report for each listed firm. The information 
“downloads” is obtained from the platform “JuChao” 
(“www.chinfo.com.cn”). 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
SDRET Stock volatility, measured by the standard deviation of weekly stock 
returns over the year.  
SDSales Standard deviation of annual sales measured over the prior three years. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
SYNC, Rsquare Stock price synchronicity is the log transformation i.e. ln �𝑅𝑅2 1− 𝑅𝑅2� � of 
the goodness of regression fit R2 (Rsquare) about stock return co-
movement. We capture it using regression specification:R𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 +
𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where Rit, Rmt, and Rindt, 
represent (average) stock return for firm i, overall market, and its industry 
at day t. Estimation window is 30 days following the release of the audit 
report. 
SYNC[0,90], 
Rsquare[0, 90] 
90-days stock price synchronicity, which is estimated as SYNC (Rsquare) 
except that the estimation window is 90-days [0, 90] following the release 
of the audit report. 
TOPHOLD The percentage of shares held by top one shareholders. 
TOPHOLD2 The square of TOPHOLD. 
TREAT In our “D1” sample, TREAT is an indicator variable that equals to 1 for 
A+H share firms, and 0 for A share firms. In our “D2” sample, TREAT is 
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an indicator variable that equals to 1 for A share firms, and 0 for A+H 
share firms.  
UE Unexpected earnings is calculated as the change of earnings per share over 
the year, deflated by t-1 years’ ending stock price. 
UEalternative Alternative measure of unexpected earnings, calculated as current earnings 
per share minus the median value of analysts’ forecasts prior to the release 
of the audit report, which is no earlier than 12 months its release, then 
deflated by ending stock price in year t-1.  
NLUE The nonlinear part of unexpected earnings, i.e., UE times absolute value of 
UE. 
VOL The natural log of firms’ average stock turnover measured as the trading 
shares divided by total outstanding shares over the fiscal year. 
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